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ABSTRACT 
Formulating naval manpower requirements is a complex problem. The results 
from workload studies can assist in this endeavor in two ways, by improving 
endurance and performance for existing crews and by providing manpower 
planners with the information necessary to determine or validate crew 
composition and size. Many naval workload studies have been conducted for a 
variety of reasons. Results from sleep measurement studies in naval operations 
indicate widespread sleep deprivation. Scientific research shows that insufficient 
and/or poor quality sleep leads to reduced individual performance and decreased 
crew endurance, an unacceptable situation for any navy. 
This thesis reviews field and simulator studies from the Royal Australian 
Navy, the United States Navy, the Royal Canadian Navy, and the civilian 
maritime sector. Major gaps in the research include the assessment of sleep 
quality onboard ships, the formal design and conduct of evaluative research 
rather than descriptive efforts, and organizational level fatigue management 
policy and education. Fatigue risk management systems are still evolving but 
have not matured to a level guaranteeing that sailors routinely receive adequate, 
acceptable quality sleep at sea. Best practices for future collaborative studies are 
suggested, and recommendations for a ten-year Royal Australian Navy research 
strategy are included. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
This thesis will focus on two aspects of the seagoing environment with 
regard to naval workload studies: improving endurance and performance for 
existing crews and providing manpower planners with the information necessary 
to determine or validate crew composition and size. Formulating manpower 
requirements is a complex problem. It requires accurate knowledge of the 
number of people and types of skills needed to complete a given set of tasks or 
missions over a designated time period. For navies, the total number of 
personnel that can be accommodated onboard a platform is just one of the 
limiting factors in the manpower determination process. Even if space availability 
is not an issue, government and key decision makers may choose to conserve 
monetary resources by restricting the size of seagoing crews, thereby leaving 
more work for fewer crewmembers. The requirement for efficient use of 
resources means that an optimized solution addressing resource constraints and 
needs of personnel must be sought. Tradeoffs will always be necessary, but care 
needs to be taken to ensure that the long-term health and safety of personnel is 
not compromised.  
Consideration of tradeoff issues should utilize an evidence-based 
decision-making process. Workload and fatigue studies provide information that 
can assist with manpower requirements decisions. A number of workload studies 
have been conducted by the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and the United States 
Navy (USN) over the last 15 years, complementing work related to maximizing 
crew endurance in many other areas and industries. These studies, including 
those by Grech, Roberts, Hamilton, Turner and Cleary (2014), Haynes (2007), 
Mason (2009), Roberts (2012), Yokeley (2012), and Young (2013), have 
increased the body of knowledge regarding naval workload and highlight the 
negative impact of fatigue on performance. Results of RAN and USN fatigue-
related workload studies have been used to suggest changes to work routines, 
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particularly alternative watchkeeping routines at sea, to allow personnel to 
increase their sleep time and reduce fatigue. Where implemented, the 
recommended changes have had a positive impact (Cordle & Shattuck, 2013; 
Grech et al., 2014). Other maritime organisations and navies have also 
undertaken similar studies; for example, a multinational collaborative effort was 
conducted on fatigue at sea (Lutzhoft, Thorslund, Kircher, & Gillberg, 2007) and 
studies have examined fatigue management in the Canadian Forces (Paul, Gray, 
Nesthus, & Miller, 2008; Paul, Ebisuzaki, McHarg, Hursh, & Miller, 2012). 
The body of knowledge on crew endurance has been built over many 
years and includes research by the United States Coast Guard (USCG) 
(Comperatore, Rivera, & Carvalhais, 2005; Miller, Smith, & McCauley, 1998) and 
studies conducted in the aviation, rail, and food service industries, as well as 
emergency medicine. These industries have similar complications to those of 
navies in terms of their requirement for 24/7 shiftwork, transit to and from the 
workplace, and an inability to replace critical workers immediately. Some of these 
results can be applied directly to the military environment. Other results are not 
as easy to apply due to the exigencies of military service, particularly for ships 
where performance is affected by additional influences, such as motion, 
compared to land-based workplaces. 
Senior decision makers are rarely directly involved in the conduct of 
workload studies. Consequently, they may not have a detailed understanding of 
the tradeoffs or assumptions that have been used to inform the 
recommendations that are made to them. In addition, these tradeoffs and 
assumptions may not be the same for each workload study, even if the 
recommendations are similar. The increased risk that one decision maker is 
happy to accept may not seem reasonable to another decision maker, or may not 
be appropriate in a different work area. If tradeoffs and assumptions are not well 
communicated, there is a danger that decision makers may apply a result or 
recommendation from one study to a new situation where it is not applicable 
and/or appropriate. 
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It is difficult to program workload studies into naval operations because 
they often result in additional tasking for a vessel and its crew and they require 
resource allocation. Workload studies may be narrowly directed or somewhat 
fragmented, either by design or necessity. Since these studies involve human 
subjects, institutional review board approval is required prior to the conduct of a 
study, which can increase the required lead time. Best practices and 
recommendations can be collated for each of the studies, but a compilation of 
best practices is not currently available. In addition, analysis on how these 
practices could be amalgamated to ensure best practice for future workload 
studies is not complete. We do not know if improvements could be combined, or 
if they are supplementary rather than complementary. In short, we are not sure if 
there might be a better, or a simpler, way to make manpower determinations. 
B. OBJECTIVE 
This thesis reviews workload studies conducted in the RAN and USN over 
the last decade and makes recommendations for future workload studies that 
would utilize best practices in the field, narrowing gaps in the current body of 
knowledge. These additional studies will assist in achieving more accurate, 
relevant, empirically based decision support tools for use by manpower 
requirements analysts and decision makers. 
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
A large amount of research on sleep, fatigue, and crew endurance has 
been conducted, and more is occurring all the time. Noting the voluminous 
amount of related research, several boundaries have been imposed to focus this 
thesis. 
1. Scope 
This thesis is not a wholesale analysis of workload studies in general, nor 
a meta-analysis of any kind. The major focus of this thesis is a comparison of 
RAN and USN studies of crew endurance as indicated by sleep and performance 
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during the period 2001–2014, with an emphasis on the latter studies due to their 
currency in terms of personnel policies, resource constraints, manning and 
similar plans. This scope is limiting; many other navies with similar manpower 
constructs to the RAN and USN may have completed similar works. Exclusion 
from detailed consideration is not a reflection on the importance of these studies; 
rather they are outside the tight focus of this thesis. 
2. Limitations 
Multiple factors, including mental and physical fatigue, influence crew 
endurance. More sleep of higher quality can serve to reduce fatigue and thereby 
support crew endurance (Miller, Shattuck, & Matsangas, 2007). Examples of 
other important factors that support crew endurance are physical fitness, diet and 
nutrition, use of technology to reduce workload, reasonable living conditions, 
adequate manning levels that support more generous personnel tempo (for 
example, planning to have enough personnel for four sections of watchstanders, 
or shifts, rather than three), and higher levels of training, expertise, or cumulative 
at-sea experience. Ships also have additional environmental issues such as 
noise, vibration and/or motion due to sea state, all of which have been and 
continue to be studied. These other factors will not be considered in detail in this 
thesis as they are outside the thesis scope. 
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter II of this thesis provides background information regarding sleep 
and crew endurance, particularly in the maritime environment, and reviews 
relevant literature on these topics. Chapter III outlines a methodology for 
comparing the design, conduct, and results of workload studies. Chapter IV 
introduces selected workload studies conducted by the RAN, USN, and others, 
and provides a comparison utilizing the methodology previously described. 
Chapter V discusses the comparison and presents the conclusion and 
recommendations. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. SLEEP AND FATIGUE 
Lack of sleep and fatigue are often thought of as similar, and even appear 
to be used interchangeably in some literature. Yet the Oxford Dictionary (2014b) 
illustrates that the meanings are quite distinct, defining sleep as “a condition of 
body and mind which typically recurs for several hours every night, in which the 
nervous system is inactive, the eyes closed, the postural muscles relaxed, and 
consciousness practically suspended.”, Sleep is something that one does, a 
condition in which one exists at certain times. Fatigue is also a condition, one 
“characterized by a lessened capacity for work and reduced efficiency of 
accomplishment, usually accompanied by a feeling of weariness and tiredness” 
(MedicineNet.com, 2014). Given that fatigue, by definition, is said to reduce 
efficiency and capacity for work, i.e., performance, and is accompanied by a 
feeling of tiredness, it can be implied that sleep would diminish fatigue, and 
therefore improve performance. In fact, many studies attest to this relationship. 
Miller, Shattuck, and Matsangas (2007) provide a concise summary regarding 
fatigue and its negative effect on performance in military environments. 
Numerous other works, including many Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
Masters theses, most recently, Roberts (2012), Brown (2012), Yokeley (2012), 
and Young (2013), discuss sleep and fatigue, and their application to the military 
environment in some detail. This thesis does not require an extensive knowledge 
of sleep; therefore, only a summary of the most relevant points will be provided. 
The circadian cycle, or rhythm, is a naturally occurring pattern that 
corresponds roughly to the 24-hour day and predicts periods of increased or 
decreased alertness, which can also be described as energy levels 
(Comperatore et al., 2005, pp. 4–5). The circadian cycle is highly resistant to 
change (Miller et al., 2007). As can be seen in Figure 1, decreased alertness can 




Figure 1.  Daily energy level cycle (from Comperatore et al., 2005, pp. 
4–5). 
The average adult requires about eight hours sleep per night, which 
generally consist of four to six 90-minute cycles of deeper (Stage 4) or lighter 
(rapid eye movement or REM) sleep (Miller et al., 2007), as illustrated in Figure 
2. 
 
Figure 2.  Sleep stages over a typical eight-hour sleep period (from 
Miller et al., 2007, p. 234). 
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Sleep requirements change over the human lifespan. Adolescents and 
young adults, those in their late teens and early to mid-20s, require 
approximately 0.5 to 1.25 hours more sleep per night. They also have a delayed 
sleep and wake time compared to other adults (Miller et al., 2007), as illustrated 
in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3.  Sleep patterns over the human lifespan (from Miller et al., 
2007, p. 233). 
So far, the discussion has been about sleep occurring during the night, but 
there are many people who do not sleep during the night because of their work 
commitments, such as emergency services and after-hours healthcare 
personnel. There are many other examples of industries that employ shift 
workers; transportation, hospitality and other services, and of course, the military. 
Shiftwork often means that people are not able to achieve eight hours of sleep in 
a 24-hour period. Even if night shift workers intend to sleep during the day, it can 
be quite difficult for them to get adequate sleep. Emergencies or unplanned 
events may require some workers to remain at work after the end of their shift; 
distractions and sleep disruptions occur, for example, sleeping during the day 
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may be difficult if you live next door to a school. Furthermore, family or other 
commitments that require you to be awake impact on planned sleep. When we 
consider shiftwork, and then superimpose the knowledge that the circadian cycle 
does not predispose personnel toward being at their most alert during the night, it 
is not surprising to discover that shift workers do not get eight hours sleep per 
day, and that the performance of shift workers may be impaired. This is 
especially true for those on night shift, shifts longer than eight hours, and shifts 
with insufficient breaks (Folkard, Lombardi, & Tucker, 2005; Folkard & Tucker, 
2003; Huey & Wickens, 1993). 
Having established that people do not always get enough sleep, it is 
important to understand why this might be the case. Shiftwork may be one 
reason, or increased work hours—either out of desire or necessity. The “can-do” 
attitude of the military culture and/or personnel shortages may contribute to 
insufficient sleep. Further, why do we care? First, the risk of errors or accidents 
increases when people are sleep deprived or if there are insufficient personnel to 
complete a job (Lazzaretti, 2008). Not having the right number of people can lead 
to sleep deprivation for those who are there—setting up a vicious circle. As 
individuals, most would have to admit to operating at less than their optimal 
performance level when they have not had enough sleep. Mandated aviation 
crew rest cycles were formulated to increase safety for aircraft and their 
passengers. Nurses driving home after the end of their shifts were found to have 
impaired driving performance, especially after night shift (Ftouni et al., 2013). 
Lazzaretti (2008) reported a negative relationship between manning levels and 
mishaps in the USN Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigates, and there is no reason 
to suppose that this result is not generalizable. A second factor that must be 
considered is the longer term health and duty of care. Employers have a 
responsibility to not cause long-term poor health in their employees, and people 
are not as likely to take, or retain, jobs where this impact is likely. A recent study 
on retired shift workers by Monk, Buysse, Billy, Fletcher, & Kennedy (2013) found 
that their “subjective and objective measures of sleep showed a detrimental effect of 
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shift work exposure.” Gallicchio and Kalesan (2009) completed a meta-analysis 
regarding sleep duration and mortality, finding a link between all-cause mortality and 
shorter (less than seven hours’ sleep per night) sleep duration. Advice from the 
World Health Organization (WHO) is that sleep deprivation is a Level 2A 
carcinogen (International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) Working 
Group, 2010). Any one of these factors should be reason for concern, but when 
they are combined, there is a compelling need to do all that is possible to ensure 
sleep deprivation does not occur. 
B. CREW ENDURANCE 
Should one search online for “crew endurance,” there are likely to be hits 
relating to the crew of the 1914 Imperial Trans-Antarctic Expedition ship 
Endurance. While this association is merely a linguistic coincidence, it is 
worthwhile to consider this story of survival against the odds, described by 
Browning (2007) in a case study as follows: “Ernest Shackleton led a crew on the 
Endurance that would attempt to be the first group of individuals to cross the 
Antarctic continent overland. Only one day’s sail away from the land, the 
Endurance became “iced in” and eventually sank, leaving the men with limited 
supplies. Shackleton’s new goal quickly became getting every man home alive.” 
There is perhaps no better way to define crew endurance than to think of 
Shackleton’s trip, together with the Oxford Dictionary (2014a) definition of 
endurance as “the capacity of something to last or to withstand wear and tear.” In 
any organization there is a requirement to complete tasks, and in militaries in 
particular, to get everyone home alive. In addition, we want our people, our 
crews, to be able to last, to withstand wear and tear. 
The phrase crew endurance may thus be a measure of the ability of a 
group to get things done without lasting detriment to themselves, to complete 
required tasks, or meet goals (either original or amended), within the constraints 
imposed by the number and/or skills of the people available. In a ship, there is 
seldom a capacity to provide immediate replacements, so some additional 
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capacity in terms of personnel is needed to ensure that missions can be safely 
completed. Being able to predict that amount accurately, translate it into a finite 
number of people and then fit all the required people into the confines of a 
warship, is the task of those who formulate naval manpower requirements.  
Once a manpower requirement has been determined, the only way to 
improve the endurance of a crew within that determination is to find a means of 
improved performance, enhanced productivity, greater efficiency, or some similar 
process. There are many ways these effects can be achieved. For example, 
better use of technology, offloading tasks to another department or a shore-
based organization, additional training or a combination of all of these methods 
can contribute to crew endurance. Performance can also be improved by 
minimizing fatigue (Miller et al., 2007), through ensuring that each individual gets 
a sufficient amount of quality sleep at an appropriate time each day. Some ways 
that this could be achieved are by changing routines, enforcing rest times, or 
providing incentives for being well rested. Workload studies are one means of 
measuring sleep, and sometimes also performance, in order to demonstrate 
increased productivity, or make recommendations regarding crew endurance. 
C. WORKLOAD STUDIES 
This thesis concentrates on the workload studies method of quantifying 
crew endurance through the objective measurement of individual sleep and, 
where possible, performance in varying situations. Once data is obtained 
regarding sleep patterns, analysis can show which groups of personnel are more 
likely to be under greater stress in each type of anticipated situation. Simulation 
tools can be used to predict failure points and alternative scheduling 
arrangements that would improve endurance times. 
1. Objective Measurement of Sleep 
Sleep is often objectively measured using wrist actigraphy. In this method, 
the motion of a person is monitored, via wrist monitors similar in size to a 
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wristwatch, such as the Ambulatory Monitoring, Incorporated (AMI)1 or Philips 
Respironics motionloggers used in recent RAN and USN studies (Davey, 2013; 
Grech et al., 2014). When using actigraphy, periods of inactivity can be 
categorized as sleep. For greater accuracy, particularly for personnel who may 
have a job that entails them remaining stationary for long periods of time, the 
data taken from the actigraphy device can be compared with a self-reported diary 
of sleep and wake times. The standard actigraphy report for workload studies 
provides an estimate of the amount of sleep per 24-hour period, which can be 
averaged across groups and/or time periods. The amount (or lack) of sleep is 
then used as an indicator for fatigue. Sleep may also be entirely self-reported; 
care must be taken using this method as self-reported sleep may overestimate 
the amount of time slept, as consistently demonstrated in a study by Mason 
(2009), probably due to the time it takes to fall asleep (sleep onset). Generally, 
actigraphy is viewed to be a more accurate measure of sleep than a self-
reported, or even observed, sleep diary (Ancoli-Israel et al., 2003; Lauderdale, 
Knutson, Yan, Liu, & Rathouz, 2008; Tryon, 2004). Unlike actigraphy, a sleep-
wake diary does not allow for an objective measurement of sleep quality. 
Current actigraphic devices are a step up, in terms of ease of use, from 
the early studies into human sleep, including those done by the USCG, which 
utilized traditional scalp electrodes with additional physiologic metrics to 
approximate polysomnograph methods for monitoring responses including brain 
function (EEG) and cardiac rhythm (ECG). While these methods remain 
appropriate for use in sleep laboratories and specific studies, the flexibility gained 
by use of a wrist monitor allows a mobile workforce to be monitored without 
detriment to their job or changes in behavior caused by participation in the study. 
Continual advances in technology mean that data collection for future studies is 
very likely to become even simpler and more efficient than it is now. Personnel 
could be fitted with a wristwatch that has actigraphy as a secondary functionality, 
                                            
1 “AMI provides unique instruments to objectively document long-term sleep, hyperactivity, 
daytime activity levels, fatigue, circadian rhythm, vigilance, and respiration as well as 
environmental light, temperature and sound measurements in ambulatory subjects” (AMI, 2014). 
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batteries are likely to last for longer, and data may be available to analysts on a 
continuous basis, perhaps even remotely, via wireless download. 
In addition to measuring sleep, sleepiness information can be collected. 
This is important in terms of performance, with a link between reduced sleep at 
night and sleepiness the following day shown to exist in both lab and field 
conditions (Åkerstedt, Axelsson, Lekander, Orsini, & Kecklund, 2013). 
Sleepiness measurements can be objective, but in the field it is simpler to use a 
subjective measurement, usually using one of a number of validated sleepiness 
scales (or variations thereof) such as the Epworth Sleepiness Scale (ESS), 
Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index (PSQI), or Stanford Sleepiness Survey (SSS). 
Lutzhoft et al. (2007) used electrooculography (EOG) in a maritime workload 
study, but concluded that this method, which records eyeball movements and 
uses the number of eye blinks as an objective sleepiness measure, did not add 
much value to the study. This finding is supported by another study, where the 
measurement of subjective sleepiness using the Karolinska Sleepiness Scale 
was shown to be as sensitive an indicator of sleepiness as objective measures 
(Åkerstedt, Anund, Axelsson, & Kecklund, 2014). 
Other tools used to look at sleep, sleepiness and performance also take 
into account general mood or happiness. These include the Canadian Forces 
Special Operations Assessment Profile (SOAP) which has six parameters 
(difficulty concentrating, level of depression, level of irritability, level of fatigue, 
work frustration and physical discomfort) (Paul et al., 2007), the Profile of Mood 
States (POMS), and surveys such as the Lark and Owl survey which categorize 
people according to their “morningness” or “eveningness” (Nguyen, 2002). The 
sleep measures discussed here are summarized in Table 1. 
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Table 1.   Sleep measures (after Miller, Crowson, & Narkevicius, 2003, 
p. 718). 





Actigraphy Motionlogger worn on wrist Lab/field $$ * 
Polysomnograph Scalp electrodes Lab/field $$$ *** 
Sleep and mood 
scales 
Subjective rating (e.g. 
ESS, PQSI, SSS, KSS, 
SOAP, POMS, Lark/Owl) 











Minimal training required 
Specialized training required 
Highly specialized technical training required 
 
 
2. Measuring Performance 
Reporting performance is more complex than reporting sleep, and 
potentially more subjective. For an assembly line worker, performance might be 
measured in terms of the number of items completed in a certain time. For other 
roles it is more difficult to measure performance but one method is to use a 
Psychomotor Vigilance Test (PVT). The PVT is a standard test that is completed 
at specified intervals during a workload study. The standard PVT is ten minutes 
in length, but field versions have been shortened to only three minutes, 
significantly simplifying participation, with no degradation in performance 
prediction (Basner, Mollicone, & Dinges, 2011). The AMI actigraphic device used 
in some RAN and USN studies has a built in PVT, which can be used to measure 
performance, in this case via response time. Participants must press a button 
when they see a stimulus—a light flash or a color change—with multiple stimuli 
offered at random intervals making up one test. 
3. Industry Studies 
Military organizations are very concerned about monitoring fatigue and 
increasing crew endurance, but they are certainly not the only industries that 
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have an interest in this area of study. All of the industries previously mentioned 
as having shift workers, especially those in areas where they are dealing with 
members of the public or paying customers, are motivated to ensure that the 
performance of their personnel is at its best, and that employee fatigue does not 
impact on the safety of the individual worker, now or in the future, or those in 
their care. 
Recent studies regarding the performance of shift workers are numerous; 
a few with results that may be broadly applicable are mentioned here. Brachet, 
David, & Duseja (2012) investigated the performance of paramedics in 
Mississippi, concluding that fatigue was the mediating factor in a deterioration in 
performance towards the end of long shifts. Their quantitative analysis suggested 
a 0.76 percent increase in 30-day mortality, or one person in every 132 treated 
by paramedics who did not survive due to paramedic fatigue. Many military ships 
or units have more than 132 personnel onboard. Even if only one of them is 
impacted by the fatigue of others it can have a large follow on impact, and if 
everyone onboard is fatigued then the impact is magnified.  
The aviation industry has had regulations covering fatigue 
countermeasures since the 1930s (Miller & Strohl, 2011), but experts continue to 
recommend updates and refinements (Caldwell et al., 2009) arising from evolving 
technologies, significant increases in air traffic volume, both military and civilian, 
etc. Studies cover civilian and military sectors, multiple job roles including pilots, 
air crew, and flight attendants; and the duration/routing of flights, including how 
many time zones have been transited (Avers & Johnson, 2011; Banks, Avers, 
Nesthus, & Hauck, 2012; Caldwell et al., 2009; Gander, 1986; Gander et al., 
2014; O'Connor, Buttrey, O'Dea, & Kennedy, 2011). 
4. Naval Workload Studies 
Similar to the civilian sector, military aviators have been compelled to 
adopt rule based fatigue countermeasures, and are literally unable to participate 
in a routine evolution if crew rest parameters are violated (United States Navy, 
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2009, pp. 8–15). This is similar to a situation that the reader may have 
experienced with some personal frustration where an airline crew for a delayed 
flight will have to be replaced if the delay means that they will “run out” of hours 
prior to the revised end time of the flight. The strict application of fatigue policy 
measures for naval sea-going personnel is not currently enforced, although this 
thesis will demonstrate support for that idea. 
The USCG conducted much of the early maritime-based sleep research in 
the United States in the latter half of the 20th Century. Their findings have been 
refined over time and implemented into USCG day-to-day routines. It is now 
common practice, or business as usual, for the USCG to consider the effect of 
fatigue via the use of the U.S. Coast Guard Guide for Managing Crew Endurance 
Risk Factors (Comperatore et al., 2005). This is not yet the case for the RAN and 
the USN, although workload studies are being conducted and the results are 
being used to minimize fatigue. 
D. USING WORKLOAD STUDY RESULTS  
Workload study results have two major uses—improving current crew 
endurance, and predicting future manpower requirements. Improvements to 
current crew endurance result when recommendations are made and changes 
implemented that allow sleep-deprived personnel to get more quality sleep each 
day. This improvement could result from something as simple as changing a 
regular meeting time, or reducing the number of phone calls or announcements 
made during particular hours (Grech et al., 2014). Improvements of this nature 
are an example of increased productivity, a factor in many workforce 
negotiations. Unfortunately, improvements can be difficult to implement, even the 
aforementioned simple change to a meeting time can be difficult to accomplish 
due to organizational inertia or change resistance. 
Predicting manpower requirements for future tasks or work areas is more 
complex; available information may be incomplete, and immediate verification 
regarding success cannot be obtained. Some indicators can be obtained through 
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the use of bio-mathematical models which are in common use. Tools such as the 
Fatigue Avoidance Scheduling Tool (FAST), in extensive use in the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DOD), Australian Defence Organisation (ADO), and 
Canadian Forces (CF), use intended work-sleep schedules to forecast predicted 
task effectiveness, and the Task Effectiveness Scheduling Tool (TEST) suggests 
an optimal schedule for a group of personnel to follow given a required task list 
and a specified level of effectiveness (Tvaryanas & Miller, 2010). The RAN Navy 
Management Diary (NMD) is not yet fully operational, but is intended to fill a 
similar role (S. Hamilton, personal communication, July 30, 2014). The Army 
Research Laboratory Improved Performance Research Integration Tool 
(IMPRINT), and other similar simulation based tools, can provide a probability of 
success for a schedule of planned and unplanned events to be completed by a 
specified group of workers with particular skills. 
Whether improving current endurance or predicting future endurance, 
there will be tradeoffs of many kinds required. One tradeoff relates to the amount 
of risk that is considered acceptable by an organization, or by different individuals 
within an organization. A person can be required to work for four hours longer 
and sleep for four hours less each day, but only if his or her employer is willing to 
accept the risk that the person may be fatigued to the point of being ineffective in 
the workplace or even a danger to themselves or others. One employer may be 
happy to accept a higher level of risk than another employer placed in the same 
situation. The tools mentioned previously are extremely useful, but their output 
may be completely wrong if the inputs, such as the level of acceptable risk, were 
inaccurate or inappropriate for a given situation. This discrepancy could arise 
simply due to different individuals having different ideas about what an 
appropriate level of risk is, or one crew having worked together for longer than 
another and therefore being slightly more proficient, or one team having many 
experienced personnel and another team having few. No matter what the reason 
is for any differences, or their magnitude, they exist in every situation and are 
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applicable to factors other than risk. Tradeoffs and assumptions were made, 
constraints imposed, and the results impacted by them. 
Every naval workload study considered here was conducted for a 
particular reason, under certain conditions, within certain constraints. The 
researchers made a large number of decisions when the study was formulated 
and conducted, and they may not have recorded each assumption, or the 
background behind it, exactly. The results are useful in that situation but cannot 
be relied upon for accurate predictions under different conditions unless the 
assumptions and limitations remain appropriate for that new situation. The only 
way to tell if workload study results can be generalized is to look closely at that 
study and the new scenario. Ideally, this task would involve an individual familiar 
with the original study in order to avoid any issues with non-documented 
assumptions or facts about the study. This use of subject matter experts is not 
always possible, and not everyone realizes that it is necessary; consequently 
there is a danger that workload study results could be, or have been, wrongly 
utilized or applied. This thesis will mitigate that risk by analyzing several workload 
studies, documenting the background to each, suggesting where gaps in the 
existing body of knowledge exist, and recommending the best practices to use 
for future workload studies. Understanding what the gaps are, and what 
assumptions have informed previous results, will allow results to be used to 
formulate policy founded on empirically based decision support mechanisms. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
Military workload studies have been conducted for multiple reasons, and 
using different variables and methods. Despite these differences, all of the 
studies can be compared if the assumptions and limitations of each study are 
recognized and considered. Results from different studies may be generalizable 
if a new situation is similar to the original study environment or if those areas 
where it is different are not relevant to the comparison. This chapter describes 
the methodology that will be used to compare selected workload studies in order 
to identify areas worthy of further study and suggest best practice for future 
workload study involvement. 
A. STUDIES COMPARED 
This thesis considers only a small fraction of the workload studies that 
have been conducted within military environments. Within the studies that will be 
considered in detail, many different approaches have been used. Some studies 
were conducted to validate a crew composition, others to try and improve a 
situation that was considered less than optimal or to try and identify the best of a 
number of options, such as deciding between different watch standing routines. 
Each study was constrained by the availability of ships able to accommodate a 
study team, the equipment available, and the willingness of the crew to 
participate. 
Every study compared includes the amount of time underway, either at 
sea or under simulated voyage conditions. Remembering that the scope of this 
thesis is to compare RAN and USN studies, these form the majority of the 
studies chosen, with a deliberate emphasis on more recent studies (since 2001) 
to ensure the most up-to-date methods are considered. Information from recent 
studies (where results have not yet been published) is included where possible. 
A cross section of aims and analysis types is desired, although there is some 
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benefit in looking at studies with similar aims, conducted in differing conditions, to 
enable a recommendation regarding generalizability of results. 
B. DESCRIPTIVE INFORMATION COMPARISON 
A comparative tabular analysis methodology is used to present selected 
information for each study. The studies are arranged by platform type, and then 
described across three areas—study description (the “who, what, when, where”), 
study methods and variables (the “how”), and study conclusions (the “so what,” 
and “what next”). This method entails a substantial amount of simplification, and 
does not allow for all of the information about each study to be included in the 
table. The major benefits of this method are that it allows easy comparison of 
studies, with potential gaps being easier to recognize. 
1. Platform Type 
Different types of platforms have different capabilities, and the roles and 
responsibilities dictated by their operating concept may change over time. 
Platforms also differ in terms of operational tempo and crew size. All of these 
factors influence onboard workload; for example, both small and large ships may 
be required to launch and recover small boats for various reasons. In a ship with 
a small crew this evolution may involve most of the crew, including those who are 
off watch. With a larger crew it could be accomplished using only personnel who 
were already on watch, therefore, having less impact on the workload of off-
watch personnel. The platform types used here are somewhat dictated by the 
literature available for comparison, but do consider similarities in crew size, and 
likely or actual role/tasking and operational tempo. Platform types are listed in 
Table 2, with indicative crew size provided as a means of classifying studies. Any 
shore-based simulation of time at sea is classified in the same way, with the 
addition of (Simulator) at the end of platform type, e.g., Civilian Ship (Simulator). 
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Table 2.   Platform types and criteria for classification. 
Platform Type (or Simulator) Crew Size / Classification Criteria 
Aircraft Carrier Any aircraft carrier 
Submarine Any submarine 
Large Warship Warship with crew size greater than 70 
Small Warship Warship with crew size less than 70 
Auxiliary Warship Any naval auxiliary with civilian ship type role 
Civilian Ship Any civilian ship 
 
Aircraft carriers and submarines are considered as separate groups 
despite the similarities that some sections within each would have with similar 
sections in a large warship, such as engine room staff (assuming similar power 
and propulsion arrangements). All groups could contain diverse platforms, and 
care must still be taken with generalization of results. For example, submarines 
can be very different; nuclear versus conventional propulsion particularly has an 
impact on crew size and work requirements. 
This thesis does not consider any studies involving a platform that would 
be classified as an auxiliary warship, but the criteria is included for completeness. 
Aircraft and shore-based commands have been, and will continue to be, the 
subject of workload studies; however, these are outside the scope of this thesis. 
2. Study Descriptions 
The first part of the comparison looks at identifying data for the study. This 
is the “who” section, and includes information about the country or countries 
leading the study, the group/s leading the study, e.g., the RAN or the USN, the 
author/s of any published reports or results from the study, and the actual 
platform/s used during the study. The “what” section of the description is a short 
summary of the purpose of the study, often taken directly from the executive 
summary of the published report. The “when” section provides the year in which 
the study was conducted, and the month/day, if available. This section also 
includes the total duration of the study, and details any phased approach such as 
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an in-port phase followed by a sea phase. Details regarding where 
(geographically) a study occurred are not always available, when provided they 
are included in this section, together with information regarding platform tasking. 
3. Study Methods and Variables 
This section is the most complex and variable in the comparison table, but 
arguably the most important as it includes the scientific methodology followed 
during the study, details about the data collection and analysis, and any known 
limitations of the study. The method or approach itself is listed in a few words 
describing the type of study that was conducted, such as observational or 
experimental, and what type of data was collected (e.g., time series). 
This section includes descriptive data about the number of personnel on 
board the platform (either from the report or the generic crew size for the class of 
ship), the number of participants in the study, and the number of participants 
whose data was used for analysis. Participants are further described by gender, 
job role (officer or sailor), department, and watch routine; including the number 
from each department or in each watch routine. If all of this information is 
available then a participation rate can be calculated (data may not be valid if only 
a very small percentage of a crew was studied), as well as a reject or dropout 
rate. This is most likely to be important if the dropout rate was high as that could 
indicate that participant workload was so large that only above average 
performers had time to participate, which could mean that fatigue results are 
understated. If departmental and/or watch routine information is available then it 
is easier to check that a representative sample has been obtained for analysis, 
and also allows for analysis by department and/or routine. Other variables used 
in the study are also listed here. 
Equipment and software used during the study are recorded with as much 
detail as possible, including version numbers, to enable comparison across 
studies. If surveys or questionnaires of any type, such as a sleep and activity log, 
are used, they are listed here as equipment. Validation of data ensures that it is 
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reasonable to use the information collected, and analysis of data provides us with 
information about what happened during a study, details regarding both of these 
factors are included here if known. When analysis involves statistical analysis, 
individual techniques are not usually listed. 
4. Study Conclusions 
The conclusions section lists the major conclusions for the study, which 
are usually related back to the purpose of the study listed early in the table. The 
pros and cons, or challenges and limitations of a study are included here if 
mentioned by the researcher. In addition, if it is obvious when reading a report 
that a limitation existed or that a particular aspect of a study was or was not 
considered, then that is also included. This section also contains any relevant 
recommendations for further study, and other notes or information not already 
included that could be important or useful, including any information about a 
study made available following publication of the initial results. 
C. CREW ENDURANCE RISK FACTORS COMPARISON 
Each study is also discussed in terms of crew endurance risk factors, with 
each factor given a “yes” or “no” depending on whether a study considered the 
impact of a risk factor, either by directly reporting that the factor was considered, 
or if it can be inferred that the factor was considered. In some cases a numeric 
value is added. This additional enhancement recognizes that for some factors 
there are a large number of subject areas that are relevant to that factor, and 
allows differentiation between the studies. A higher value is awarded if the factor 
was quantitatively analyzed. The scale used is shown in Table 3: 
Table 3.   Crew endurance risk factors use and analysis scale. 
0 not considered 
1 partial consideration (1–2 subject areas from question list considered) 
2 comprehensive consideration (3 or more subject areas considered) OR 
partial consideration and quantitative analysis 
3 comprehensive consideration and quantitative analysis 
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The list of factors used is in Table 4, with the questions related to each 
factor being examples of the types of subject areas addressed or questions a 
study might provide answers to if that factor was considered as part of the study. 
The list of questions is not exhaustive, and there may be some overlap between 
categories, such as between sleep quality and environment. 




How much sleep is obtained in a 24-hour period? 
Is historical sleep data collected/available (for baselining)? 
Is napping possible? 
Is major sleep episode at same time each day? 
Sleep quality How many sleep episodes per 24-hour period? 
What time of day did participants sleep? 
Where did participants sleep? Usual location or different? 
New time zone? 
Were there any factor/s that inhibited sleep quality? 
Work 
schedule 
How many hours work? 
Are historical work schedules available? 
Are fatigue predicting tools updated with actual schedules? 
Rest breaks? 
Shift worker? 
What hours did you work (identify night workers)? 
What type of watch routine is being used? 
Do the watch sections rotate? If so, how often, which 
direction? 
Commuting time 
Work type Work location 
How physically or mentally demanding is the work? 
How stressful is the work? 
How repetitive is the work? 
Team or individual? If team based, how long has the team 
been working together 
Organization 
& Culture 
Work related stress e.g. from inflexible or un-empowering 
culture 
Rules-based organization? 
Clear procedures and policies? 





Health, including existing sleep disorders 
Diet/nutrition 
Use of caffeine/tobacco 
Consumption of alcohol/drugs (including legal medication 
such as sleeping pills) 
Opportunity for exercise/amount of exercise 





Susceptible to motion sickness? 
Historical performance during continuous/sustained 
operations 
Environment Have environmentals such as weather, motion, noise, 
temperature been considered? Were any extreme? 
Were bunking arrangements considered e.g. type of bedding, 
private/shared rooms/bunks? 
Was light exposure noted, particularly just prior to sleep 
time? 
 
This list is a simplified compilation of factors taken from official fatigue 
management/crew endurance/safety documents produced by several 
organizations. The original documentation includes the RAN factors that 
contribute to fatigue list, USN guidelines for aviation fatigue management, USCG 
crew endurance risk factors assessment form, Canadian forces fatigue risk 
management information, and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) fatigue risk 
assessment tool and fatigue risk management system sample fatigue report. 
Further information on each of these contributing publications is provided in the 
following sections. 
1. RAN Fatigue Factors 
The Navy Safety Management System for the RAN is detailed in 
publication ABR 6303 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2014), the document 
includes a chapter relating to fatigue. The ABR 6303 list of factors that contribute 
to fatigue, and a checklist for investigating officers of factors to consider when 
ascertaining if fatigue was a causal factor in an incident, have been used in 
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compiling the fatigue factors list used in this thesis. The original lists are not 
reproduced here due to distribution limitations. 
2. USN Factors Affecting Aircrew Performance 
Military aviation has a history of being more advanced than the surface 
fleet in terms of mandated crew rest, probably due to linkages to civil aviation 
standards. The Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization 
(NATOPS) General Flight and Operating Instructions (United States Navy, 2009) 
lists factors affecting aircrew performance. Those factors that are relevant for 
personnel in other work areas are presented in Table 5 (anthropometric and 
personal traits, for example, beards, corrective lenses for vision, have been 
omitted): 
Table 5.   Selected NATOPS factors affecting aircrew performance 
(United States Navy, 2009, pp. 8-15–8-23). 
crew rest and sleep 
circadian rhythm 
flight time 




dental care (with respect to injectable drugs or intravenous sedatives) 
pregnancy 
emotional upset/excessive stress 
immunizations and injections 
blood donation 
hypobaric or hyperbaric exposure 
dehydration 
simulator sickness (this could be expanded to motion sickness) 
performance maintenance during continuous and sustained operations (this is 




3. USCG Crew Endurance Risk Factors 
The USCG Crew Endurance Risk Factors Assessment Form in Figure 4 is 
part of the USCG Crew Endurance Management System (CEMS). This system is 
considered to be the most mature of the fatigue management systems included 
here.  
 
Figure 4.  USCG Crew Endurance Risk Factors Assessment Form (from 
Comperatore et al., 2005, pp. 2-4). 
CEMS is used throughout the USCG, with anecdotal evidence suggesting 
that, unlike the RAN and USN, personal sleep hygiene and command 
consideration of fatigue-related issues is the standard rather than the exception. 
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CEMS has been demonstrated to have successful application in other maritime 
industry areas such as the towing industry (United States Coast Guard, 2005). 
The earlier implementation of maritime fatigue management processes as a 
mandated system, and translation to similar industries, may be related to the 
roles of the USCG, including safety and rescue. The USCG has a vested interest 
in ensuring that other mariners are not impacted by fatigue, low numbers of 
accidents, investigation or rescues are good if the reason is that there is no need 
for them due to education and widespread implementation of fatigue 
management systems. 
4. Canadian Forces Fatigue Risk Management 
Defence Research and Development Canada provides general 
recommendations on fatigue risk management for the Canadian Forces under 
the headings listed in Table 6. Guidance is also provided on several topics with a 
notation that further research is required; these topics include nutrition, over-the-
counter preparations (such as melatonin), bright light exposure, and exercise 
(Cheung, Vatanian, Hofer, & Bouak, 2010). 
Table 6.   Canadian Forces fatigue risk management 
recommendations (Cheung et al., 2010, pp. 19–35). 
Identify and treat physiological sleep disorders 
Minimize sleep loss by maintaining good sleep hygiene 
Implement strategic naps or short sleeps 
Anchor sleep (regular sleep period at least four hours long obtained at the 
same time each day) 
Judicious use of caffeine 
Guidelines for duty/rest scheduling 
Guidelines on shift lag management 
Guidelines for trans-meridian travel: how to manage jet lag 
Guidelines for using sedatives 
Guidelines for pharmacological stimulants 
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5. FAA Fatigue Risk Assessment Tool by Pulsar Informatics 
The FAA Fatigue Risk Assessment Tool produced in conjunction with 
Pulsar Informatics (Pulsar Informatics & FAA, 2014) is shown in Figure 5. This is 
an online tool that uses historical sleep and work information for the preceding 
three days to produce a fatigue assessment for a potential work shift of interest. 
This tool uses very few of the fatigue factors in the assessment list produced for 
this thesis, but many of the other factors are mitigated by the requirement for 
each pilot or air crew member to advise if they are not fit for duty at any time; in 
other words they agree that they are fit for duty prior to the commencement of 
each duty period (United States Department of Transportation, 2011). 
 
Figure 5.  FAA (USA) Fatigue Risk Assessment Tool. 
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The FAA does not have a mandatory fatigue risk management system, but 
does have an advisory circular that provides details of an acceptable method for 
development of a fatigue risk management system (United States Department of 
Transportation, 2013). This document includes a sample fatigue report that 
suggests consideration of the topics listed in Table 7. 
Table 7.   FAA fatigue report considerations (United States Department 
of Transportation, 2013, pp. 19–23). 
fatigue occurrence rest (previous 72 hours) 
commuter sleep opportunities 
reserve pilot assignment circadian issues 
operational issues nutrition and hydration 
augmented crew personal factors 
hotel/suitable accommodation pre-duty activities 
 
D. STUDY COMPARISON TABLE 
The selected data for each study is tabulated in an Excel spreadsheet 
containing all of the items discussed. Each study is detailed across one row, with 
each of the elements listed in Table 8 having a separate column. The table is not 
reproduced here due to size and distribution limitations, but relevant excerpts are 
included in the analysis discussion in Chapter IV as appropriate. 
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Table 8.   Data included in comparison table. 
Description 




“what”  purpose of study 
“when”  year 
 month/day 
 duration 
“where”  geographical location 
 tasking/role 
Methods and Variables 
“how”  method or approach 
 number of personnel onboard 
 number of participants 
 number of participants data analyzed 
 gender, age, job role, department, watch 
routine 
 other variables 
 equipment 
 software 
 data validation techniques 
 data analysis techniques 
Conclusions 
  conclusions 
 recommendations for further study 
 challenges 
 limitations 
 other notes 
Crew Endurance Risk Factors 
  sleep quantity 
 sleep quality 
 work schedule 
 work type 
 individual & lifestyle 




E. IDENTIFYING GAPS AND BEST PRACTICES 
Gaps in knowledge can be identified in three ways using the comparison 
table. These are gaps in rows, gaps or queries in columns, and gaps provided by 
previous researchers. First, if it is not possible to fully complete a row due to the 
study not considering some areas of interest, a lack of information about a study, 
or because the study is not yet complete, then that may indicate a gap. (This 
does not invalidate a study; it could merely indicate that the scope of a study was 
limited to begin with or that the study had a different focus from the aspects 
considered here.) Similarly, if a factor from the risk management guides is not or 
only partially considered in a study, then that could also indicate a gap. Next, if a 
particular section of the table or even just one column has limited data, then this 
could mean that studies have not yet addressed this topic in detail. Finally, most 
researchers provide suggested areas for further research, which are very likely to 
be gaps suitable for further study, particularly if more than one report 
recommends a particular type of research be conducted in the future. 
A list of best practices for workload studies can be assembled in a similar 
manner. If every study conducted uses a technique, then it is likely to be worthy 
of use. If a researcher comments on an aspect of their study in favorable terms, 
then it is likely that it will also be of benefit to others to utilize. 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
The 17 studies selected for comparison were conducted over the period 
from 1997 to 2013. Not all studies conducted by the RAN and USN were 
included in the final comparison. Some studies were precluded due to distribution 
limitations, while others were omitted due to their close similarity. If information 
from the same studies has been published in multiple locations then all 
documents are listed. Some studies from countries other than Australia and the 
United States (and from the civilian maritime sector) were included to allow 
generalizability of results to be discussed in greater depth. In addition, research 
into naval and maritime workload and fatigue is ongoing. Therefore, there were 
studies where results have not yet been published (or were not readily available) 
but enough is known about the study or the findings to warrant inclusion. A few of 
these studies were mentioned in the analysis, but were not included in the 
comparison table as the paucity of knowledge in some areas could lead to 
erroneous gap analysis. Table 9 provides a list of the studies selected for 
comparison in this thesis. The list is arranged by country and in chronological 
order from earliest to most recent. Platform type designation, as described in 
Chapter III, is also provided in the Country/Group column. 
Table 9.   Workload studies comparison list. 




2000 The management of stress and fatigue 
amongst Royal Australian Navy submariners: A 





2011 Crew endurance at sea: An analysis of sleep, 
work-hours and fatigue across a deployment 







Crew fatigue and performance on U.S. Coast 
Guard cutters (Miller et al., 1998) 
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2002 The effects of reversing sleep-wake cycles on 
sleep and fatigue on the crew of USS John C. 
Stennis (Nguyen, 2002) and Working the 
nightshift on the USS John C. Stennis: 
Implications for enhancing warfighter 





2003 An analysis of the effectiveness of a new 
watchstanding schedule for U.S. submariners 
(Osborn, 2004) & Submarine watch schedules: 
Underway evaluation of rotating 
(contemporary) and compressed (alternative) 
schedules (Duplessis, Miller, Crepeau, Osborn, 




2004 Effects of noise, temperature, humidity, motion 
and light on the sleep patterns of the crew of 




2007 A comparison between the Navy standard 
workweek and the actual work and rest 




2008 A comparative analysis between the Navy 
standard workweek and the work/rest patterns 





2009 A comparative analysis between the Navy 
standard workweek and the actual work/rest 





2011 Maritime platform sleep and performance 
study: Evaluating the SAFTE model for 




2012 A comparison of sleep and performance of 
sailors on an operationally deployed US Navy 




2013 Effects of sleep deprivation on US Navy 
watchstander performance onboard the 
independence class littoral combat ship (LCS-




2007 An assessment of the CF submarine watch 
schedule variants for impact on modeled crew 
performance (Paul et al., 2008) & Alternative 
submarine watch schedules: 
Recommendations for a new CF watch 
schedule (Paul, Hursh, & Miller, 2010) 
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2011 An assessment of some watch schedule 
variants used in CDN patrol frigates: OP 
Nanook 2011 (Paul et al., 2012) 
Sweden 
Swedish National 
Road and Transport 
Research Institute 
(VTI) 
2007 Fatigue at sea (Lutzhoft et al., 2007) 
Finland 






Effects of 6/6 and 4/8 watch systems on 
sleepiness among bridge officers (Härmä, 







2011 Project Horizon - a wake-up call: Research into 
the effects of sleepiness on the cognitive 
performance of maritime watchkeepers under 
different watch patterns, using ships' bridge, 
engine and liquid cargo handling simulators 
(Project Horizon, 2012) and Sleep, sleepiness 
and neurobehavioral performance while on 
watch in a simulated 4 hours on/8 hours off 
maritime watch system (van Leeuwen et al., 
2013) 
 
A. COMPARISON OF STUDIES 
Studies are compared under the headings described in Chapter III. 
Examples from outside the list of compared studies and from non-maritime 
industries (such as aviation) are used to highlight similarities, or demonstrate 
uniqueness, as appropriate. 
1. Platform Type 
The comparison considered one aircraft carrier study, three submarine 
studies, three small warship studies, seven large warship studies, and three 
civilian maritime industry studies (one completed in simulators). These are shown 
by type and country in Figure 6, with a study represented by a solid dot. RAN and 
USN studies that were not considered in the comparison but which are relevant 
to this thesis are listed in Table 10, and shown in Figure 6 as open circles. 
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Figure 6.  Studies by platform type and country/research group. 
Table 10.   Additional RAN and USN studies. 
Country/Group Year Study Topic 
Australia/RAN 
Submarine 
2004 Two-section watch alternative trial HMAS 
RANKIN (Hussey, 2004) 
Australia/RAN 
Submarine 
2008 Three-section trial HMAS COLLINS 2008 
(Buckley, full report not available) 
Australia/RAN/DSTO 
Small Warships 
2009 Several surveys (McLean, Grech, & Elischer, 
2009, report not available for distribution) 
Australia/RAN 
Small Warship 
2013 Armidale Class Patrol Boat study 
USA/USN/NPS 
Large Warship 
2013 USS BENFOLD study 
USA/USN/NPS 
Aircraft Carrier 
2014 USS NIMITZ study 
Australia/RAN 
Submarine 
2016 Planned study 
 
A large number of the studies recommend that further examination of the 
same topic be completed in different platform types, recognizing that each type of 
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ship has factors that make it unique. Having said that, the author also considers 
that there might be some similarities across groups that have not been 
investigated. Submarine participants might have some similar results as those for 
aircraft carrier below-deck night workers (both have limited, but not necessarily 
zero, access to sunlight); or there could be similarities between surface ships and 
aircraft carriers for workers in similar roles such as bridge workers. These 
similarities were investigated, but not confirmed, in this review; each study was 
tailored toward its own aim and did not include enough general information to 
draw any conclusions regarding the groups. In the case of the surface ship 
bridge workers, we do not know if the study participants worked on the bridge, if 
topside aircraft carrier and surface ship workers have similar routines, or what 
the bunking arrangements for each platform are in terms of disturbances when 
off watch. Information limitations aside, certainly each platform type has unique 
factors, but the overall results are not markedly different in terms of 
measurements of amounts of sleep.2 
All three civilian maritime industry studies, including one completed in 
simulators rather than underway, looked at a comparison between 6/6 (two-
section six-hours on six-hours off) and 4/8 (three-section four-hours on eight-
hours off) watch schedules, and came to similar conclusions. These happen to 
be the same conclusions reached by naval studies comparing these two watch 
systems: the 6/6 (two-section) watch system is more tiring than the 4/8 (three-
section) (Härmä et al., 2008; Lutzhoft et al., 2007; Paul et al., 2012; Project 
Horizon, 2012). This finding may be coincidental, or it may be that there is only 
one real conclusion when the 6/6 and 4/8 watch systems are compared. 
Regardless of the reason, we cannot conclude that all simulator-based studies 
are able to predict underway fatigue accurately and/or that all civilian maritime 
studies are generalizable to navies. However, the result does imply that people 
                                            
2 A notable exception to this assertion is the amount of total sleep per day for topside aircraft 
carrier participants working the night shift and sleeping during the day. Nguyen (2002) found that 
topside workers working nights and sleeping days received much less sleep per day than below-
deck night shift workers. This result will be discussed later in this chapter. 
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perform and react in similar ways in similar situations, and that watch system 
comparisons may be generalized across platform types (including carefully 
designed use of simulators) and industries, or at the very least that the results 
found in one area should be an assumed starting position for another platform or 
work area. 
2. Study Descriptions 
The 17 studies reviewed took place all over the world, in all types of 
situations, from simulators to warlike operations, and in calm to rough seas. 
Geographical and environmental data was not provided in all cases. The number 
of days of data collection was between three (Nguyen, 2002) and a prodigious 
125 days (Grech et al., 2014), with one to three weeks being the most common 
duration. The number of platforms involved in each study was most commonly 
one; although six studies did have more than one vessel involved. The largest 
representation came from the Finnish study conducted by Härmä et al. (2008), 
with receipt of 92 separate survey responses from individuals, providing details of 
the respondents’ most recent continuous seven days at sea. 
In terms of what the studies aimed to achieve, they can be broadly 
separated into two groups. The first group appears to be more observational in 
nature, or focused on baseline data collection. Studies in this group measured 
sleep and either measured or predicted performance, with predictions based on 
the actual amount of sleep received, as collected via actigraphy or self-reported. 
Additional variables hypothesized to have an impact on sleep and/or 
performance, such as motion or light exposure, were included in some cases. 





Table 11.   Studies measuring sleep and/or performance. 
Group/Type Year Study Focus 
RAN 
Submarine 
2000 Stress and fatigue amongst Royal Australian Navy 
submariners (Chapman, 2001) 
RAN 
Large Warship 
2011 Analysis of sleep, work-hours and fatigue (RAN 





Crew fatigue and performance (USCG cutters) 
(Miller et al., 1998) 
USN/NPS 
Aircraft Carrier 
2002 Effect of reversing sleep-wake cycles on sleep and 
fatigue (Miller & Nguyen, 2003; Nguyen, 2002) 
USN/NPS 
Small Warship 
2004 Effect of noise, temperature, humidity, motion and 
light on sleep patterns (Archibald, 2005) 
USN/NPS 
Large Warship 




2008 Compare NSWW to actual work/rest patterns (USN 
cruisers) (Mason, 2009) 
USN/NPS 
Large Warship 
2009 Compare NSWW to actual work/rest patterns (USN 
frigate) (Green, 2009) 
USN/NPS/Other 
Small Warship 
2011 Evaluate SAFTE model for maritime workplace 
application (Brown, 2012) 
USN/NPS/ONR 
Small Warship 




2007 Assessment of CF submarine watch schedule 
variants (Paul et al., 2010; Paul et al., 2008) 
RCN/DRDC 
Large Warship 
2011 Assessment of CF frigate watch schedule variants 
(Paul et al., 2012) 
 
The second group of studies extends the research by adding a deliberate 
comparison of watch schedules and/or comprehensive work/sleep information 
(for example, not just how much people are sleeping, but also how much they are 
working and what type of work they are doing). The latter group, of more formally 
designed evaluative studies, is focused on making a choice between two or more 
options, or increasing knowledge beyond a description of actual sleep and/or 
performance, in order to look for relationships that explain sleep quantity/quality 
and the follow-on effect on performance. As shown in Table 12, every study in 
this second group looked at a comparison between alternative watch schedules, 
although this is not the only type of evaluation that could occur.  
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Table 12.   Studies comparing watch schedules. 
Group/Type Year Study Focus 
USN/NPS/other DOD 
Submarine 
2003 Evaluate rotating (contemporary) and 
compressed (alternative) schedules 
(Duplessis et al., 2007; Osborn, 2004) 
USN/NPS 
Large Warship 
2012 Compare 6/6 and 3/9 watch routines 
(Young, 2013) 
Swedish National Road 
and Transport Research 
Institute (VTI) 
2007 Compare 6/6 and 4/8 watch routines 
(Lutzhoft et al., 2007) 





Compare 6/6 and 4/8 watch routines for 




Civilian Ship (Simulators)  
2011 Effects of sleepiness on performance 
under different watch patterns, 
predominately 6/6 and 4/8 (Project 
Horizon, 2012; van Leeuwen et al., 2013) 
 
There is overlap between the two groups; that is, some studies in the 
more descriptive group provided comparisons between different departments 
onboard, or groups of people. It would appear that earlier studies conducted by a 
country/group or with regard to a particular platform type, collected data for 
baseline purposes or to create or validate modeling tools, while later studies 
investigated alternative watch schedules to identify areas for potential 
improvement. More of these evaluative studies are expected to appear in the 
literature in the future. The 2013 USS BENFOLD and 2014 USS NIMITZ studies 
conducted by the USN and NPS (N. Shattuck, personal communication, 
November 26, 2014) fall into this category. All of the civilian studies that were 
reviewed are in the second group, albeit with quite a lot of overlap. This is 
especially true for Project Horizon where the data collected has been used to 
produce a fatigue management modeling tool called MARTHA (Project Horizon, 
2012). 
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3. Study Variables and Methods 
The studies reviewed in this thesis used similar variables and methods of 
analysis. Specific aspects of interest are reported here; noting that this is by no 
means an inclusive listing. 
a. Age and Gender 
Age and gender were not recorded or analyzed in all studies; none of the 
results suggest that either is vitally important for naval workload studies which 
may be why they were not considered in detail. However, age and gender details 
are very quick and easy to collect and should be noted to ensure completeness 
of data sets and to allow later analysis if desired. Gender was not found to be 
significant with respect to sleep or performance in the selected studies; however, 
this finding could be due to the small numbers of female compared to male 
participants in the male-dominated maritime and military environments. Sawyer 
(2004), in a NPS thesis involving personnel onboard an aircraft carrier, 
recommended that further studies attempt to achieve a more equitable gender 
balance. This inequity is not surprising since the sample of females is 
representative of the population. Militaries are not usually gender balanced. Age 
was found to be of interest in some cases, but results were not consistent across 
studies, and age-related analysis was not always completed. Implying 
generalization of results with respect to age is not viable without further research. 
Age may be a proxy for a range of other factors, such as rank, time in service 
and time at sea, but this finding is expected only if there is direct and consistent 
correlation with age. This relationship would be less true for the RAN than the 
USN, since the RAN has more latitude with respect to age on entry, and does not 
have an “up-or-out” policy. Where specified, average age, and age range, of 
participants for civilian studies was higher than seen in military studies, as is 
shown in Table 13. 
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Table 13.   Average age of participants in specified studies (standard 
deviation in parentheses where available). 
Platform Average (Mean) Age 
Aircraft Carrier (Nguyen, 2002) 25.6 years 
Large Warship (Mason, 2009) 29 (7.2) years 
Large Warship (Miller et al., 1998) 29 years, range 22-40 years 
Large warship (Paul et al., 2012) 32.9 (7.7) years, range 21-48 years 
Small Warship (Brown, 2012) 35.8 (5.92) years 
Submarine (Paul et al., 2008) 38.6 (7.6) years, range 26-54 years 
Civilian ship (Lutzhoft et al., 2007) 41.5 (9.9) years 
 
b. Participants 
It is uncommon for substantial monetary or other incentives to be provided 
for participation in sleep studies such as those compared in this thesis. This is 
particularly true in naval studies; most participation relies upon the investigator to 
explain to potential volunteers the importance of their participation to the overall 
results, thus eliciting their cooperation. Study participation takes time out of 
already busy days for the individual volunteering for these studies. However, 
since participants within an industry are generally aware of the increased safety 
risk and performance degradation caused by fatigue, they are often pleased to 
be able to assist in furthering research that is expected to lead to improved 
conditions and/or outcomes.  
It is important to ensure that fatigue risk management studies do not 
induce additional and unnecessary fatigue. In the recommendations for 
implementation of a fatigue risk management system (FRMS), the FAA specifies 
the use of a “measurement methodology that will be sufficient to demonstrate 
that operations under the FRMS do not induce additional fatigue relative to 
operations under the prevailing prescriptive rules” (United States Department of 
Transportation, 2013). Any study of this nature must also expect that if conditions 
change or tasking varies, volunteers may withdraw. The studies reviewed here all 
relied upon volunteers, and usually did not involve a large proportion of the 
vessel’s population. Deliberate efforts were made to avoid self-selection bias and 
achieve a representative mix of personnel from across departments, ranks, 
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gender, etc., but initial and/or final numbers of participants were not always large 
enough for valid statistical comparisons to be made. For example, the large 
warship study by Green (2009) experienced a 50 percent dropout rate in 
participation, calling into question whether the final dataset was representative of 
the population. This problem may be able to be avoided if a much larger sample 
is recruited for a study, although resources may not support this decision. 
c. Department and Watch Schedule 
Studies that compared departments found statistically significant 
differences in sleep quantity and quality, probably related to different watch 
routines employed by different departments. This finding was also of interest due 
to the possibility that the culture of individual departments varies and could 
account for some of the differences observed (Haynes, 2007; Mason, 2009). One 
submarine study suggested that minimum sleep requirements should be 
calculated by department to allow for the different risk factors associated with 
different tasks in each department (Chapman, 2001). Departmental data did not 
have large sample sizes (ranging from 2 to 15 participants); departmental 
divisions were not always the same. Some departments might be combined for a 
study, but not in the same way each time, and departments varied by ship type 
and country. Watch schedules also varied by department, so departments were 
difficult to compare. Consequently, generalizations were not available from this 
review. In the future, departmental data should be collected for all studies, noting 
that additional questions should be included to ensure that a person is actually 
working within their assigned department (for example, misclassification can 
occur for personnel working as a food service attendant (Green, 2009)), and 
specifying what the exact watch routine is for the work area. 
Officers tended to be grouped as their own department, rather than being 
included with a work area. It does make sense to analyze data by rank or rank 
grouping, and senior personnel (both officers and enlisted) were found to receive 
less sleep than junior personnel in a number of studies (Archibald, 2005; Green, 
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2009; Mason, 2009). Inclusion of officers within work areas may also be relevant, 
especially if the cultural aspects of a department are being investigated.  
Watch schedule information is difficult to collect and record accurately, 
particularly when terms such as “Straight 8s”, “Five and Dime” or “Dogged 4s” 
may not be commonly understood by all participants and readers. In addition to 
actual time on watch, a watch schedule needs to specify when personnel have 
an opportunity to sleep. It is important to know if people have other duties when 
they are off watch and/or are able to sleep during the day. If there is a complex 
system, a change in watch schedule, or a routine watch amendment (such as on 
some civilian vessels where the Master stands one watch per day, allowing the 
usual watch standers an “unscheduled” break from watch), this deviation must be 
noted. Diagrams may be effective in reporting these types of watch schedules, 
such as the four-section weekly rotating watch system shown in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7.  An example of a 3/9 watch shifted forward on Sunday with no 
consecutive watches (from Roberts, 2012, p. 68). 
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d. Other Variables 
Other variables were noted when they were the focus of a study, such as 
the light, motion, and noise data collected by Archibald (2005). Caffeine and 
tobacco/nicotine use information was sometimes collected but seldom reported, 
usually because it was not the major focus of the study. In the civilian ship 
simulator study, it was noted that participants were restricted to no more than 
four cups of coffee per day (Project Horizon, 2012). 
e. Data Analysis and Validation 
Variables measured in these studies ran the gamut: they were objective 
and subjective, observed and self-reported, with continuous and non-continuous 
data. Parametric statistical analysis was used for normally distributed continuous 
data; non-parametric analysis was used for analysis of Likert-like sleepiness or 
mood scale results. Some studies utilized multivariate regression analysis, with a 
mixed effects model most often specified; sleep quantity was the usual 
dependent variable. 
Techniques used to validate data were not widely reported, although 
actigraphy downloads were commonly checked against sleep-wake logs, and 
then individually “cleaned” to ensure the highest possible level of accuracy. 
Onboard actigraphic data download and cross-checking, perhaps daily, was 
suggested as a means of increasing accuracy, to avoid the potential for 
difficulties encountered when attempting to query results with individuals after the 
study is complete. 
Different sleepiness scales were used across the studies reviewed, with 
each research group tending to stay with one particular scale; for example, the 
USN/NPS studies use the Epworth Sleepiness Scale while Scandinavian-based 
groups tend to use the locally-developed Karolinska Sleepiness Scale. Tools for 
deriving predicted effectiveness also varied, again with a local or language of 
origin effect being visible. FAST was used in all of the RAN, USN and CF studies 
but in none of the civilian studies. The ability to input intended sleep times into 
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FAST and calculate predicted effectiveness means that potential risks can be 
avoided. This idea was replicated across the studies reviewed, with the RAN 
NMD and heat map diagrams playing a similar role in risk avoidance (Grech et 
al., 2014). Data from Project Horizon was used to produce a civilian ship-oriented 
tool called MARTHA which can be used for alertness or performance prediction 
(Project Horizon, 2012). IMPRINT was not used in any of the studies reviewed, 
but may be appropriate for later studies. It would also be interesting to compare 
predictions of FAST, NMD, and MARTHA for the same data sets to determine 
how their results compare with one another. 
f. Baseline Performance 
Establishing an individual’s baseline performance when they are not 
fatigued is seldom possible, particularly in military field studies. While there is no 
guarantee that having baseline data would substantially change the final results, 
it would be useful to verify that idea. Many of the studies reviewed suggested that 
further research should include baseline data collection. FAST assumes a three-
day preconditioning period to reduce errors induced by an incorrect historical 
baseline. The default value for this preconditioning period is eight hours of quality 
sleep per day. Some studies that utilized FAST reported that the first three days 
of data were not used in the analysis, but it was not clear in every case that 
preconditioning had occurred. In the real world of naval operations, three 
consecutive days of eight hours of quality sleep each night is rare, assuming that 
it occurs will have a significant impact on the study results. Another assumption 
in FAST is that the individual is awake for one hour before and after watch. While 
this may be true on average, it would be prudent to validate this assumption 
using actual data or surveys. The experience of the author suggests that the 
length of time before and after watch differs depending on the specific watch and 
the number of days a vessel has been at sea. 
Even with accurate baseline data, the location, tasking or previous activity 
of participants could have an impact on results. Paul (2012) specifically notes 
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that participants in the CF submarine study commenced the study in a fully 
rested state due to a one-month defect rectification period, but that participants in 
the CF large warship study had been at sea for three weeks prior to the 
helicopter embarkation of the study team. Green (2009) suggests that workload 
studies should take place in warlike conditions; and Miller et al. (1998) noted that 
the USCG vessels studied were not subject to a high operational tempo during 
the data collection period. 
Performance improvement due to the learning effect was raised as an 
issue by Brown (2012), with respect to the switching test used as a performance 
indicator. She also noted that the PVT does not have a learning effect, thereby 
avoiding this issue. Some suggestions for remedying this problem include 
choosing a test that does not have a learning effect, baselining data, or 
administering a test for seven days prior to the study as suggested by Davey 
(2013) with regard to the switching test. 
A more complicated problem was reported by Paul et al. (2008, p. 3), 
demonstrating that it is difficult to predict with certainty what the second and third 
order effects of an action may be, and suggesting that researchers perhaps 
should not share too much data with participants during the study: 
Probably the most compelling reason that the PVT data are of 
questionable utility is that a significant number of subjects were 
competing for the fast reaction time of the day, every day and this 
resulted in a shift in the area of the speed-accuracy trade-off curve 
at which these subjects were choosing to perform. Essentially, for 
good reaction time data, the subjects should respond as quickly as 
they can without making mistakes in which case the tolerable error 
rate is about 2%. However, in their quest for speed, accuracy was 
sacrificed and many of the subjects had as many errors as correct 
responses making their data unusable. 
g. Readability 
An important component of any research is the ability to communicate the 
method and results in a manner that makes it easy for the intended audience to 
understand, but with enough detail for a more informed reader to be able to: a) 
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make an assessment regarding generalization of results, b) use the method to 
replicate results, and c) provide sufficient background detail to enable collection 
of comparable data. Several of the studies reviewed here have characteristics 
that make them reader friendly. Two are provided here as examples that ensure 
maximum attention and understanding by a variety of readers. Firstly, use of a 
concise summary paragraph regarding methodology employed, with sufficient 
detail regarding statistical analysis to enable replication, similar to that provided 
in the CF studies, for example: 
Such ‘interval data’ is not normally distributed and is therefore 
analysed via non-parametric statistics. The Kruskal-Wallis analysis 
was used to assess group differences, and the Friedman Analysis 
of Variance (ANOVA) to test repeated measures across days. The 
Wilcoxon test was also used to assess matched pairs of cells. … A 
split-plot ANOVA with 3 between factors (i.e. 3 different watch 
system variants) and 12 repeated measures (i.e. 12 days at sea) 
was used for analysis of the VAS data. (Paul et al., 2008, pp. 4–5) 
The second example is to provide a summary of measures used and how 
they were collected, as shown in Figure 8 from the USCG cutter study. 
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Figure 8.  Summary of measures (from Miller et al., 1998, p. 16). 
4. Study Conclusions 
Not every study that was reviewed reached a definitive conclusion or 
proved an expected result, usually as a result of missing data or limitations on 
the sample size (e.g., Davey, 2013; Green, 2009; Lutzhoft et al., 2007). Many 
studies provided information or suggestions appropriate to list as a gap or best 
practice; these items are discussed in a later section. This section details the 
average amount of sleep obtained by study participants, and uses this 
information to illustrate how conclusions and results can be misinterpreted.  
When available, the average amount of sleep per 24-hour period for all 
participants in each study is provided in Table 14, together with the NSWW daily 
sleep allowance, and the amounts of daily sleep recommended by experts and 
obtained by Americans as reported by Roberts (2012). 
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Table 14.   Average amount of sleep per 24-hour period for specified 
studies/groups (highest to lowest). 
Platform Average Sleep 
per 24-hours 
NSWW allowance 8 hours 
Sleep experts recommend 7.5 to 8 hours 
Large Warship (Haynes, 2007) 7.3 hours 
Large Warship (Grech et al., 2014) 7.2 hours 
Large Warship (2) (Mason, 2009) 7.15 hours 
Submarine (Osborn, 2004) 7.1 hours 
Large Warship (1) (Mason, 2009) 6.93 hours 
American national average 6.9 hours 
Large Warship (Green, 2009) 6.72 hours 
Large Warship (Young, 2013) 6.3 hours 
Aircraft Carrier (Nguyen, 2002) 6.17 hours 
 
While none of the values reaches the eight hours planned for in the 
NSWW, the range of 6 to 7.5 hours may seem fairly reasonable, more than half 
of the platforms have participants getting more average sleep per day than the 
American average provided by Roberts (2012). This conclusion would, however, 
be erroneous since overall averages can be somewhat misleading and should 
not be taken as applicable to all people or situations. Consider how the following 
additional information that is available in Table 15 expands our understanding of 










Table 15.   Average amount of sleep per 24-hour period for specified 
studies, by watch schedule or department (note that 
“Operations” department is not the same in the RAN and USN). 
Platform & Average Sleep Average Sleep per 24-hours by 
watch or department 
NSWW allowance 8 hours 8 hours 
Sleep experts 7.5 to 8 hours 7.5 to 8 hours 
Large Warship (Grech et al., 2014) 
7.2 hours 
Operations and engineering 
received less sleep at sea than 
supply and electrical departments 
during all study stages 
Large Warship (combined) (Mason, 
2009)  
Operations 7.32 hours 
Supply 6.93 hours  
Combat 6.69 hours 
Engineering 6.33 hours 
Submarine (Osborn, 2004) 7.1 hours (existing schedule) 
6.6 hours (modified experimental)
6.3 hours (experimental) 
American national average 6.9 hours 
Large Warship (Green, 2009) 
6.72 hours 
Supply 8.29 hours  
Combat 6.62 hours 
Nav/Admin 6.46 hours 
Operations 6.36 hours 
Engineering 5.82 hours 
Large Warship (Young, 2013) 
6.3 hours 
3/9 watch 6.53 hours 
6/6 watch 5.52 hours 
Aircraft Carrier (Nguyen, 2002) 
6.17 hours 
Below deck workers 7.37 hours 
Above deck workers 4.74 hours 
Project Horizon (Project Horizon, 
2012) 
4/8 team two 7 hours 
4/8 team one 6 hours 
6/6 watch “markedly less,” in two 
parts 
 
The two tables demonstrate the dangers associated with the 
generalization of results, and incomplete understanding of the background of a 
study. The sleep of participants in Green’s large warship study seemed 
marginally acceptable in Table 14, with an average sleep amount of 6.72 hours 
per day. However, when we look at Table 15 we have much more information to 
draw upon. First, we need to examine the supply department more closely to find 
out what they are doing that allows them to get more sleep (8.29 hours on 
average). Perhaps more importantly we need to find out why the engineering 
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department is only getting an average of 5.82 hours sleep per day, and then 
rectify that issue. 
Departments are combined in different ways in different studies; the 
results for a department on one ship are not the same as for the same 
department on another ship and may not be the same for the same department 
at a different time. Even more concerning is that we know is that it is not just 
sleep quantity we need to worry about, but equally important is sleep quality. 
There is no allowance made in these studies for factors affecting sleep quality or 
for split sleep (more than one sleep episode per day). Unless sleep is measured 
actigraphically and adjusted for sleep quality, the actual sleep may be even less 
than initially reported. The situation involving split sleep can be particularly 
misleading since the sum of two sleep episodes is not considered to be 
somewhat less than rather than equivalent to their total (Lutzhoft et al., 2007). 
5. Crew Endurance Risk Factors 
The crew endurance risk factors used in this thesis were described in 
detail in Chapter III, the broad groups are: sleep quantity, sleep quality, work 
schedule, work type, individual and lifestyle, organization and culture, and 
environment. All of the studies considered looked at sleep quantity in detail, and 
most considered sleep quality in some manner, but the other crew endurance 
risk factors investigated were not considered by all the studies reviewed, and the 
results of the analysis of most of these risk factors were not reported. Work 
schedules were commonly considered, but type of work was not. For example, a 
sailor could have been doing manually demanding physical labor for 10 hours or 
monitoring a visual display. Both are fatiguing but they cannot be assumed to be 
identical in their end result. Individual and lifestyle factor data collected only 
included caffeine, tobacco, and alcohol use, and this data was not reported in 
any detail. Organizational and cultural factors were mentioned when there was a 
potential change management issue; for example, announcements over the 
intercom and loudspeaker may have been postponed until after 1000 to allow the 
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night watch to sleep late; meeting times were moved to earlier in the day to better 
accommodate sleep schedules. Environmental factors were mentioned only 
when they were a topic of interest in the study, such as when motion, noise or 
temperature variables were investigated. 
Even though reporting of results regarding crew endurance risk factors 
was limited, the results that were provided suggest that some generalizability of 
results is appropriate even though studies are not always completely 
generalizable. People are people, many of the crew endurance risk factors used 
here apply equally to people in any platform. For example, a 6/6 two-section 
system results in decreased sleep quantity and quality (due to fragmented sleep) 
when compared to other two watch systems; the platform makes little difference.  
All of the crew endurance risk factors investigated here are likely to be of 
interest in future research, particularly sleep quality and work schedule which are 
influenced by organization and culture. For sleep quality, issues of sleep 
fragmentation, whether related to watch schedule or not, and organizational 
changes that may allow sleep to be of better quality are topics of interest. Having 
individual rooms and padding doors, as mentioned by Watt (2009) as a means of 
zealously guarding aircrew sleep quality may not be possible onboard ships, but 
there are likely to be other potential improvements that could improve the quality 
of the sleeping compartments. The bio-mathematical performance effectiveness 
models used have had some validation in the maritime environment (Brown, 
2012) but further investigation as to their accuracy in alternative conditions is 
appropriate. The extension of research into lighting, noise and similar factors 




B. THE EVOLUTION OF SLEEP STUDIES INTO CREW ENDURANCE 
MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS 
The study features discussed in the previous sections demonstrate that 
more recent studies investigate sleep quantity, and then use it as a means of 
calculating cognitive effectiveness, and/or also measure performance. The study 
of crew endurance is maturing, moving from a focus on what is occurring; to 
measuring or predicting performance. The next major milestones are to 
determine how to achieve the highest possible cognitive effectiveness, decrease 
risk, increase safety, and make sleep hygiene an individual responsibility enabled 
by their organization. Tools such as the USCG CEMS (Comperatore et al., 2005) 
and Roberts (2012) advice to command on watch schedules are examples of the 
information now available to assist personnel. The maturing of this process can 
be compared with the ADDIE model for training development, the OODA loop, or 
many other scientific method or research methodology theories. For example, 
similar approaches are found in the Technical Cooperation Program’s Guide for 
Understanding and Implementing Defense Experimentation (GUIDEx) (Bowley et 
al., 2006) or Bardach’s (2011) eightfold path to effective problem solving. A 
simple problem-solving model for any problem/issue/question is a modified 
ADDIE model3 consisting of four steps : 
1. Assess the situation. 
2. Develop a potential solution/s. 
3. Implement a solution. 
4. Evaluate the results (and then return to the beginning). 
The study of crew endurance has moved through this cycle multiple times, 
solving many problems and coming up with many more questions. If each group 
represented in the studies reviewed is considered over time, the evolution from 
assess (i.e. measure sleep) to develop (come up with an alternative watch 
                                            
3 The ADDIE model is considered sourceless (Molenda, 2003), therefore this modification 
shares that trait. 
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schedule) and implement/evaluate (observe and come up with another question 
to assess) is apparent. 
The USCG as an organization has the most mature implementation of 
crew endurance for the groups studied, with assessment beginning in the 1980s 
leading to the development of the first version of CEMS in 2003. Updates (CEMS 
v2), and translation to other similar industry areas (towing vessels) were 
accomplished in 2005. For USCG ships, anecdotal evidence indicates that sleep 
hygiene is understood by all individuals, and fatigue management is supported at 
the organizational level as “business as usual”. 
The USN may have done more at-sea studies than any other navy, and 
the USN/NPS collaboration is a very useful way to both produce reports and to 
educate personnel from across the world regarding fatigue. Davey (2013, p. 9) 
states that “Efforts to correct the issue of fatigue within the Navy were at a 
standstill until the early 2000s when Dr. Nita Shattuck, in conjunction with NPS 
thesis students, began to renegotiate the Navy’s “sleep when you’re dead” 
culture.” It is apparent that fatigue management has been important to many 
personnel in the USN over a long period of time but challenges to organizational 
level communication endure despite the best efforts of numerous personnel. A 3 
November 2014 link shared on the NPS Facebook page mentioned that research 
by NPS Associate Professor Nita Shattuck into non-standard watch schedules 
was supported by the Commander, Submarine Forces, Vice Admiral Michael 
Connor (Naval Postgraduate School, 2014). It quickly garnered the comment 
shown in Figure 9:4 
                                            
4 While not necessary given that it is in the public domain, the author did attempt to contact 
the commenter, listed on Facebook as a retired USN Captain, for permission to reproduce this 
comment. The then-Commander Cutler Dawson mentioned is assumed to be VADM Dawson 
(retired), who served in the USN for 34 years and in 2014 was President and CEO of the Navy 
Federal Credit Union (Roberts, 2014). 
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Figure 9.  NPS Facebook post comment (from Inbody, 2014). 
Gaining traction to achieve organizational awareness and implementation 
of a FRMS is an ongoing process, especially in an organization as large as the 
U.S. DOD. The movement from descriptive studies assessing sleep in 
submarines in 2001 (Blassingame, 2001; Gamboa, 2002), to operational studies 
all over the world on multiple platforms of all types, continuing through to the 
current evaluative testing of alternative watch schedules, and planned production 
of further fatigue related educational programs are indications that the USN is 
making a great deal of headway. 
The RAN has also been formally investigating sleep onboard platforms 
since at least 2001 (Chapman, 2001), albeit at a much slower pace than the 
much larger USN. In 2011, the RAN completed what may be the largest 
underway actigraphic study in the world (Grech et al., 2014). The project built on 
the experience of the USN by consulting with NPS faculty in the development 
and implementation of the project. High level support via the New Generation 
Navy (NGN) program (NGN Project 13—People-focused work practices), the 
dedication of an entire chapter to fatigue in the 2014 version of the Navy Safety 
Management System publication, a domestic safety award for the efforts aboard 
HMAS WARRAMUNGA during and after the 2011 study, and the implementation 
of the NMD at sea are all contributing to a broader understanding of the 
importance of fatigue. The next steps could be to confirm applicability of previous 
results to other platforms through detailed analysis of data collected aboard a 
RAN patrol boat in 2013, another example of fruitful collaboration with the NPS. 
In addition, ongoing submarine studies are planned for 2015–2016; and work 
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could continue toward a standalone FRMS or crew endurance publication for the 
RAN. Ultimately personnel in ships should be able to operate under the same 
type of crew rest principles that naval aircrew already adhere to, monitored 
regularly using tools such as the NMD to ensure potential problems with 
schedules are identified and rectified before they occur. 
Watch schedule research in the RCN was furthered due to an unfortunate 
circumstance involving a fatal fire onboard a RCN submarine in 2005. The board 
of inquiry modeled the fatigue of personnel onboard which led to field studies that 
showed even higher levels of fatigue on RCN submarines than had been 
predicted by the model. The International Submarine Watch Schedule 
Symposium hosted by Canada in 2009 (attended by the RAN, USN, and others) 
discussed watch schedule alternatives. As a result, the CF implemented a 
revised two-section watch system across their submarine fleet, improving 
modeled cognitive effectiveness by 30 percent compared to the original system 
(M. Paul, personal communication, October 24, 2014). The CF have also been 
proactive with work on the extension of submarine watch schedule research to 
surface vessels. In 2010, they published a CF fatigue risk management guide, 
which although aviation-driven is still applicable to the maritime environment 
(Cheung et al., 2010). 
Civilian shipping studies were outside the scope of this thesis and have 
not been comprehensively reviewed here. However, a few comments about 
civilian shipping studies may be appropriate. The 2010 ‘Manila Amendments’ to 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) Standards of Training, Certification 
and Watchkeeping (STCW) allow for a 91-hour workweek, or up to 98 hours per 
week for two weeks in exceptional circumstances (Project Horizon, 2012). This 
change has no doubt predicated some research. An alarming statistic generated 
by Project Horizon found that 40 percent of participants fell asleep on watch 
(Project Horizon, 2012). This finding should prompt even more action about the 
issue of fatigue and work schedules in the civilian shipping industry. 
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The results of civilian shipping studies may not be directly applicable to 
the naval environment: it is unlikely that 40 percent of navy watch standers are 
falling asleep, especially given the larger numbers of personnel on watch at any 
time and the fact that they may have additional tasking compared to their civilian 
counterparts. However, it is highly likely that some navy watch standers are 
falling asleep on watch and that many are performing at sub-optimal levels, every 
step needs to be taken to prevent this from occurring.  
C. GAPS AND BEST PRACTICES 
The descriptive and evaluative studies reviewed in this thesis had many 
differences and a number of commonalities. They detailed what was successful 
during their study and what was not, either specifically or generally. The specific 
advice and the more intangible messages gleaned from looking carefully at the 
whole group of studies can be combined to compile a list of practices that should 
be encouraged, or avoided. In addition, suggestions can be made as to what 
additional research might be needed to increase the body of knowledge 
regarding fatigue and crew endurance. Gaps identified from the comparison of 
the selected studies are grouped by subject and provided in Table 16. Discussion 
of the issue is included in situ, if not previously covered. 
Table 16.   Gaps identified from comparison of studies. 
Gap Discussion 
Environment Extreme or unusual conditions (such as bad weather) have not 
been extensively studied. 
Sleep quality Further investigation of sleep quality is necessary; this is a large 




Crew endurance risk factors such as the effect of 
pharmacological interventions and other influences such as 
caffeine, tobacco, alcohol, family stress, and so on have not 




Individuals are affected in different ways by their environment; 
for example, some get seasick, while others may not. There are 
individual tolerances for sleep deprivation. Little research on this 
topic was evident, when it did occur it was due to exceptionally 
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Gap Discussion 
large individual differences (Paul et al., 2008, p. 6), which may 




Most studies were done in isolation. Conducting the same study 
at the same time on a variety of platforms would allow for cross-
comparison by holding many extraneous variables constant. 
Manpower 
policies 
There is a potential gap between what studies are investigating 
and what assumptions manpower requirements organisations 
use. Increased communication between researchers and 
manpower personnel may be appropriate. A number of studies 
have found that the 3/9 watch system is preferred over others, 
such as the 4/8 or 5/10. This is hardly surprising given that this is 
comparing a four-section watch system (the 3/9) to a three-
section watch system (4/8 or 5/10); logically the four-section 
watch system is likely to be preferred. For surface ships, current 
manpower requirements are largely based on a three-section 
watch system. If there are enough people for a four-section 
watch system to be used then there could be an issue with other 
work not being completed, or an oversupply of personnel to an 
area. There is little value in recommending a four-section watch 
system to improve crew endurance if manpower requirements 





There is evidence of improvements resulting from several of 
these studies. For example, HMAS WARRAMUNGA 
implemented substantial changes to routines (Turner, 2012), and 
ongoing USS NIMITZ work predicts performance improvement 
due to changing of watch schedules. Notwithstanding, little 
evidence is available to show that evaluation is occurring and 
that FRMS are working. Even less information is available to 
demonstrate organizational level learning. The Watt study (2009) 
demonstrated successful scheduling, but the methodology does 
not appear to be used widely. The 2010 CF submarine study 
recommended an 8-4-4-8 routine rather than the then current 6-
6-6-6 routine, with a predicted 23 percent overall increase in 
mean cognitive effectiveness (Paul et al., 2010), but results of 
the recommended at-sea trial are not publically available. The 
information was obtained via personal correspondence. 
Changes to routines, meal times, etc., are not always simple and 
may even be considered to be “more trouble than they are 
worth,” but if evidence from another study showed a 23 percent 
increase in cognitive effectiveness, it is difficult to argue about 






Ongoing evaluation of fatigue management tools is needed. 
FAST has been validated with actual versus predicted 
effectiveness data (Brown, 2012). Some issues related to ship 
movement are known, but can be accommodated. FAST, like 
most tools, is evolving; the versions used in the studies 
compared in this thesis ranged from beta through to version 3. 




Comparison of different fatigue management tools, such as 
FAST, NMD and MARTHA, by calculating effectiveness 
predictions for a single data set, would increase knowledge 
about the generalizability of conclusions across research efforts. 
Similarly, the use of IMPRINT for further comparison and 
validation could be investigated. 
Education It is time to take further steps in the education process. CEMS, 
and the U.S. Navy Safety Center videos are a good start, but 
somewhat concerning is anecdotal evidence that fatigue 
prevention measures do not survive past a particular command 
team. Eventually those commanders will have higher level 
command jobs, and education will occur. Having education more 
rapidly available, at the organizational level, would be beneficial. 
 
The use of best practices is also important, not just during studies but also 
afterward when results are promulgated and others are able to benefit from a 
completed study by using relevant results in their own unit. A personal example 
is included here to demonstrate a situation where widespread promulgation of 
best practices may have improved crew endurance. Many studies, completed 
over many years, have found that rotating watches forward rather than backward, 
or not rotating the watch at sea at all, is preferable. However, the authors 
experience and recent watch comparison studies still refer to ships having a 
three-section, dogged, backwardly rotating watch system, such as the one shown 
in Figure 10, which is in common use in the RAN.  
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Figure 10.  Three-section watch system, dogged, rotating. 
As a patrol boat navigator in the late 1990s it did not occur to the author to 
schedule personnel in a forward rotating system, and I do not recall it being 
suggested. Previous to that time, when at the whim of other schedulers, I was 
always placed in a backwardly rotating system. These decisions were probably 
made because rotating forward is not as simple or intuitive as directing someone 
to come in earlier for the next watch rotation. Standing fixed watches (i.e. not 
rotating watches at all) is usually unpopular with those keeping watch in the 
middle of the night. But, given a diagram5 and told that using that plan rather than 
rotating backward will substantially increase the minimum predicted effectiveness 
for personnel and decrease the percentage of time that personnel are below 70 
                                            
5 See, for example, Figure 7, p. 44. 
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percent predicted effectiveness (Roberts, 2012, appendix B), I would have used 
it. Unfortunately, I did not have this information; but by promulgating gaps and 
best practices, awareness of better ways to mitigate fatigue and manage crew 
endurance will increase. 
Table 17.   Best practices for naval workload studies. 
Practice Discussion 
Sample size When designing studies, use as large a sample as possible; 
strive to accommodate all volunteers, and seek more. A larger 
proportion of involvement by the ships company means that 
withdrawals are less likely to bias results and that sufficient 
data will be available to ensure that results are representative 
of the population. If equipment limitations are the only factor 
precluding additional participation, consider borrowing 
additional equipment. 
Baseline data Collect baseline data, for example, baseline sleep data, or 
three days worth of data for FAST preconditioning. A good 
example of this is evident in the 2007 underway submarine 
watch evaluation (Duplessis et al., 2007). 
General data Include general information in studies. Collect more 
demographic information (age, gender) than you think you 
may need. The opportunity is not available later, and the 
details could be useful to you or others for reasons that were 
not evident at the time of the study. Include departmental and 
employment data even if it may not be specifically required. If 
there is a question where you already think you know the 
answer (for example, what hours do you work?), provide a list 
of options and an “other” box to reduce the workload for 
participants. 
Sleep disorders Ask about sleep disorders. Some individuals may have, or 
develop, sleep disorders that impact their performance. 
Regular health screening should uncover these conditions, but 
questions can also be asked of study participants to ascertain 
if a sleep disorder is likely so that observations that could 
skew results are not included in the data set.  
Objective 
measures 
Use actigraphy rather than self-reported sleep, and download 




Use of previous 
research results 
Start with a “best guess” based on research from a variety of 
sources, military and civilian, and potentially outside the 
maritime industry. If one study shows that a particular two-
section watch system is much better than another one, then it 
is very likely that similar results will be achieved elsewhere. 
There is no need to reinvent the wheel. For example, Roberts’ 
(2012) guide for commanders has information regarding many 
watch schedules, including day-time naval work requirements 
and the corresponding FAST predictions. This resource would 
provide a good place to start when choosing an alternative 




The fundamentals of shift work adhering to the chronohygiene 
principles listed by Duplessis et al. (2007) (some taken from 
as far back as 1992, and no doubt earlier) have not changed. 
Use them. 1. Adherence to 24-hour work-rest schedules 2. 
Adoption of a long, protected period of uninterrupted sleep 3. 
Minimization of sleep fragmentation 4. Maximizing time off 
between shifts 5. Limiting work shifts to eight hours per 24-
hour period 6. Adopting a fixed vice rotating shift 7. Minimizing 
shift turnover frequency 
Program sleep Program sleep as well as—or instead of—programming work, 
and use the most effective watch schedule available. 
Examining predicted sleep is how FAST and other models 
predict effectiveness, and the theory can be used in reverse to 
ensure adequate sleep. An option used by an F-15 squadron 
with great success in an unpredictable operational 
environment was programming sleep time rather than work 
time, and zealously guarding sleep quality (Watt, 2009). It is 
not easy to achieve this for a number of reasons. First, it goes 
against cultural norms to encourage rest in the military. Next, 
protecting sleep is a complex issue, especially in shared 
berthing facilities. Finally, trainees must become proficient 
during each watch time, not just one, so rotation of watches is 
attractive to trainers and schedulers. 
FRMS Mandate the use of organizational FRMS. If you do not have 
one; get one or use someone else’s. 
Reporting 
results 
Provide results in plain English, but explain exactly what you 
did. Sleep and crew endurance studies need to be read and 
understood by high-level decision makers who are not 
statisticians, or modeling experts. It would be helpful if titles 
for papers were carefully selected to maximize the chance of 
researchers finding them online with distribution made as 
broad as possible, including online access (for example, 





Comparison of watch schedules should only occur when the 
same number of hours per day is being worked in each.  
Solutions versus 
treatments 
Look for causes rather than treating symptoms. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In a 2008 fatigue research meta-analysis, Allen, Wardsworth, and Smith 
(2008) stated “Fatigue has been noticeably under-researched in the maritime 
domain compared to other transport sectors.” The author would assert, happily, 
that this statement is now less true, but there is still some way to go. It is 
reasonable that workload studies are not the only task or the highest priority for 
any ship, naval or civilian. Operational tasking has priority; time is money in 
terms of delivery of goods transported by sea, and most vessels are already busy 
with the tasks that they have been assigned. Generally, study teams have to take 
what they can get and make the best of it in terms of programming/availability of 
platforms, the number of volunteer participants, how many drop-outs a study 
experiences prior to completion, the quality of self-reported data, and so on. 
What has been achieved with respect to workload studies and education 
regarding the risks of fatigue is a testament to the dedication and tenaciousness 
of the many individuals and groups who recognize the importance of crew 
endurance and the role of fatigue management, and are educating others about 
these issues. 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
All those involved in what has been done thus far in naval crew endurance 
management should feel rightly proud. However there is still work to be done. 
Major gaps in the research identified in this review are the assessment of crew 
endurance risk factors, particularly sleep quality, onboard ships, the formal 
design and conduct of evaluative research rather than descriptive efforts, and 
organizational level fatigue management policy and education. Fatigue risk 
management systems are still evolving but have not matured to a level 
guaranteeing sailors routinely receive adequate, quality, sleep at sea.  
Based on the review of studies in this thesis three main ideas are 
summarized as recommendations for future crew endurance studies. These 
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ideas are not revolutionary and their applicability extends well beyond crew 
endurance. A pictorial representation is provided in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11.  A recommended approach for future crew endurance studies. 
1. Research and Develop 
Look at what else has been done. Think critically about the limitations and 
assumptions from other studies. The results are not likely to be completely 
generalizable, but they are a better place to start than with nothing at all. If a 6-6 
two-section watch system is not the best option in a Canadian submarine, it 
probably is not the best option in any other conventionally powered submarine 
either (or nuclear submarine, or surface ship). Come up with potential solutions; 
the more suggestions there are, the more likely it is that one of them will work. 
Having said that, do not get stuck here. Do not develop forever and do not keep 
replicating work that has already been done. Move on from descriptive study, 
measuring the symptoms, to more evaluative study that identifies and fixes the 
cause of an issue or challenge.  
2. Implement and Evaluate 
It is not enough to merely identify a potential problem and suggest a 
possible solution; researchers must also implement the suggested solution and 
evaluate the results to see if it works. It is then possible to take note of what does 
not work, and go back to research and development and see if it can be fixed. 
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3. Collaborate and Share 
Collaboration increases a pool of information, enhances knowledge, and 
reduces replication. At the most basic level, crew endurance is about safety and 
individual performance; it does not need to be a closely held secret. Certainly 
there are particular aspects of studies and specific results regarding performance 
of military personnel that are not appropriate to share, but this should not mean 
that the distribution of a study is always limited. 
Collaboration is not always the cheapest or easiest option. Often a 
collaborative team-based approach takes longer to implement than an individual 
one. But it is equally true that the results of collaborative efforts are generally 
superior, and internet-based communication has significantly reduced the 
potential costs of collaborating. It is important to collaborate early since this can 
avoid unnecessary duplication of activity. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis does not presume to have examined all areas of crew 
endurance, or to have transformed the author into a subject matter expert 
capable of formulating organizational-level study plans for the next decade. It has 
shown that the RAN and the USN have invested heavily in workload studies and 
are evolving toward a situation where adequate, quality sleep at sea is both a 
possibility and a requirement. Collaboration between the RAN and the USN is 
excellent, and care should be taken to ensure that it does not diminish, to the 
detriment of both parties. 
The RAN is much smaller than the USN, and there is a similar mismatch 
in the quantum of investment and resources available to research, based on the 
relative size of the population, economy, industry etc. The RAN has completed 
fewer workload studies than the USN, and the results are not as widely 
distributed. However, high study participation rates, the greater flexibility in 
cultural change etc. that may be possible in a smaller group, and the existence of 
some unique platforms and schedules could allow Australia to take the lead in 
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some fatigue research efforts. Australia and the RAN need to be astute in 
leveraging opportunities and focusing expertise to maximize ongoing cooperative 
research in the areas of sleep, fatigue mitigation, and crew endurance.  
It is recommended that the RAN pursue the following opportunities in 
order to further ongoing, mutually beneficial cooperative study with the USN, and 
other appropriate groups: 
1. Provide the USN with regular updates on NMD implementation and 
compare results with FAST analysis (ongoing). 
2. Formalize arrangements for mutually beneficial sharing of 
equipment, personnel expertise, and study results (1–2 years). 
3. Complete detailed analysis of the RAN patrol boat data collected in 
2013 and confirm applicability of results to other small warship 
platforms, such as LCS (1–2 years). 
4. Develop a shared database of data sets to enable cross-validation 
and comparison of tools, especially NMD and FAST (1–3 years). 
5. Investigate watch systems common in the RAN but not widely used 
in the USN, specifically three-section watch systems such as the 
one previously shown in Figure 10, p. 61 (3–5 years). 
6. Complete RAN submarine studies planned for 2015–2016, in 
discussion with USN/NPS, and perhaps the RCN, to enable 
comparable analysis of results with similar USN/RCN studies (4–7 
years). 
7. Work toward a standalone RAN FRMS or crew endurance policy, 
including stricter application of fatigue policy measures for naval 
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